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FRANCHISES, REQUIREMENTS CONTRACTS AND TIE-INS:
ONE TEST FOR A TANGLED TWO*
ALTHOUGH the Supreme Court has often dealt with the antitrust implica-
tions of exclusive dealing practices 3 - requirements contracts, exclusive deal-
erships and tying arrangements - the Court has failed to develop a unitary
rule of law to govern the area.2 In recent years, one basic test has emerged to
measure the legality of tying arrangements 3 and a second has been applied
to the other forms of exclusive dealing.4 Current law thus seems to rest on the
assumption that the various exclusive dealing arrangements are clearly dis-
tinguishable.3 If, however, this assumption is unwarranted, continued applica-
tion of the two tests in the area may well lead to confusion concerning the ap-
plicability of the respective tests to a particular exclusive dealing practice.
Tying arrangements have been defined as agreements by a party to sell one
product only on the condition that a buyer also purchase a different, or tied
product, from the seller, or that a buyer not purchase the tied product from
any other supplier.6 The current standard for measuring the validity of such
tying arrangements has derived from International Salt Co. v. United States.,
In that case the Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment holding illegal
the lease of patented salt processing machines on the condition that the lessees
purchase salt from the lessor. Defendants argued that summary judgment was
inappropriate since it precluded trial on the factual issues of whether the re-
*Susser v. Carvel Corp, 332 F2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. grantcd, 33 U.S.L NV=n
3151 (U.S. Oct. 27,1964).
1. Among the leading cases in the area of exclusive dealing are: United States v.
Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Tampa Elec. Co. -. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320
(1961); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Standard Oil Co. of
Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
US. 392 (1947); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Pick Mfg.
Co. v. General Motors Corp, 299 U.S. 3 (1936); International Business Machs. Corp.
v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923);
United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922); Standard Fashion Co.
v. Magrane-Houston Co, 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
2. Compare Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), uith Tampa Elem.
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
3. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
4. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. 365 U.S. 320 (1961). For a recent
judicial acceptance of the presence of two tests, see Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505,
511 (2d Cir. 1964).
5. See the approach of the Supreme Court to tying arrangements in Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the approach of the Court to requirements con-
tracts in Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), and the ease
with which the court apparently distinguished various exclusive dealing practices in Susser
v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
6. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
7. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
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straint created by the tying arrangement was unreasonable under section 1 of
the Sherman Act or substantially lessened competition under section 3 of the
Clayton Act.8 In response, the Court held that "it is unreasonable, per se, to
foreclose competitors from any substantial market."0 Presumably the bare
fact that the arrangement prevented competing suppliers from selling $500,000
worth of salt in the market closed by the tying arrangement established the
requisite substantiality.10 Subsequently, confusion developed concerning the
application of the per se test of International Salt,"1 and consequently the Su-
preme Court redefined the International Salt holding in Northcrn Pacific Ry.
v. United States.'2 There defendant's sale of land on the condition that the
buyer ship all produce from the purchased land over defendant's railroad was
attacked under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Answering the contention that
monopoly power over the tying item (the land) was necessary to a finding of
illegality, the Court held:
They [tie-ins] are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party
has sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to ap-
preciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product
and a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce is affected.1 0
8. Tying arrangements and other forms of exclusive dealing are subject to three
antitrust statutes. Section I of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1958), outlaws every contract in restraint of trade; exclusive dealing contracts
clearly fall within its reach. Both a rule of reason and a per se test have been fashioned
under § 1. Exclusive dealing practices are also subject to the broad reach of § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 41 (1958), which pro-
scribes unfair methods of competition. It has been said that § 5 comprehends all practicer
which would violate Sherman Act § 1 and § 3 of the Clayton Act, if not more. FTC v.
Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394, 400-01 (1953). The only specific
statutory enactment aimed directly at exclusive dealing practices is § 3 of the Clayton
Act, which provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . to lease or make a
sale or contract for sale of goods . . . whether patented or unpatented ... on the
condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall
not use or deal in the goods ... of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or
seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale of such condition
... may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly In any
line of commerce.
38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958). Since § 3 only reaches exclusive dealing
involving commodities, non-commodity eases are brought under either Sherman § 1 or
FTC § 5.
9. 332 U.S. at 396.
10. The case was decided without reference to the impact of the arrangement In a
relevant product or geographic market. The approach of the Court in Infernational Salt
was underscored by dicta in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320,
326-27 (1961).
11. For a prime example of the Supreme Court's effort to apply the Internalloual
Salt test in a subsequent case, see Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594 (1953).
12. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
13. Id. at 6.
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The most recent Supreme Court case involving tying arrangements is United
States v. Loew's, Inc.,14 which involved the license of copyrighted feature films
on the condition that the licensees accept a package of other films. In Loca's
the Court amplified the test of Northern Pacifc by holding that sufficient eco-
nomic power over the tying device is presumed when the tying device is pat-
ented or copyrighted, or may be inferred from the uniqueness of, or consumer
desirability for, the tying item. 5 Since uniqueness or desirability might be
inferred when a tying arrangement is successful, 0 and since the "appreciable"
restraint of free competition has been measured in quantitative terms rather
than by the anticompetitive effect in a carefully defined market,'7 a tying ar-
rangement which involves a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce would
appear illegal without further inquiry. Whether tying arrangements are, in
every case, a per se violation of the antitrust laws may still be an open ques-
tion.'8 But even if there are special circumstances which justify the use of a
tying arrangement, the thrust of current law is undeniably in the direction of
per se illegality.' 9
Underlying the case law on tying arrangements is the theory that they
generate two kinds of economic injury. First, they are seen as devices which
foreclose competing suppliers of the tied product from the buyers' market.2
Foreclosure alone, however, does not seem to have compelled the strict test
which has emerged, since there are other kinds of contracts which also fore-
close but which are tested under more lenient standards.2 ' The second injury
14. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
15. Id. at 45-46.
16. If a tying arrangement is accepted, on standard theory it would be the buyer's
desire to acquire the tying product which prompted the buyer to accept. Uniqueness or
desirability, therefore, would be the core reason for the success of such an arrangement.
17. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 US. 392 (1947).
18. For a discussion of the per se concept as applied to tying arrangements, see Bald-
win & McFarland, Tying Arrangements in Law and Economics, 8 Amrrrusr Bu.. 743
(1963). For judicial comment on the possibility that the per se rule is not applicable in
every case, see Standard 'Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 at 306 (1949).
See also White Mdtor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 353, 263 (1963) ; Brown Shoe Co.
V. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962). For cases actually upholding tying arrange-
ments, see Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962); Dehydrating Process
Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1951);
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.. 187 F. Supp. 545 (R.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd Per
curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). For an analysis of the kind of tying arrangement contem-
plated by the dicta in White Motor and before the court in Jerrold Electronics, see Note,
The Use of Tie-Ins in New Industries, 70 YAE I.J. 804 (1961).
19. For a careful study of-the law concerning tying arrangements, and an argument
supporting a rule of per se illegality, see Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements
Under theAntitrust Laws, 72 HAv. I. REv. 50 (1958).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
21. For example, see the Supreme Courtes treatment of requirements contracts in
Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), which at least required
the testing of effect in a relevant geographic and product market, and the more recent
and less strict approach in Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
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is thought to be the forcing of buyers to forego their choice of substitutes for
the tied products.22 Both injuries ultimately result from the leverage the seller
has over the tying device, without which there would be no inducement to
purchase the tied product. Tying arrangements have been characterized as
monopolizing devices which allow a seller to transfer his economic power
from one market to another; illegality is premised on the application of leverage
to exploit a second market, where, absent a tying arrangement, the tied product
would have to compete on its merits.
23
Concurrent with the development of tie-in case law a second doctrine con-
cerning other forms of exclusive dealing has appeared, and has recently cul-
minated in a test which is significantly different from that applicable to tying
arrangements. This body of law has its roots in Standard Oil Co. of California
v. United States (Standard Stations).21 In that case the Supreme Court held
illegal Standard's requirements contracts with 16% of the independent gasoline
stations in the relevant geographic market.25 Justice Frankfurter, writing for
22. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
23. For a case which explains clearly the Supreme Court's reaction to situations iln-
volving transfers of power, see United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948). In Tlmel-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), the Supreme Court e:-
plained the leverage theory:
[T]he essence of illegality in tying agreements is the wielding of monopolistic
leverage; a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire
into the next.
345 U.S. at 611. In the same vein, the Supreme Court had earlier stated:
[O]nly the prospect of reducing competition would persuade a seller to adopt
[a tie-in] ... and only his control of the supply of the tying device, whether con-
ferred by patent monopoly or otherwise obtained, could induce a buyer to enter one.
Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949). The Attorney
General's report on antitrust laws also adopts this view of tying arrangements. RnroniT
OF THE ATT'Y GEN.'s NAT'L COM,. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 145 (1955). For a
comprehensive view of tying arrangements which weaves together the strands of these
opinions, see Turner, supra note 19.
Whether such leverage is exercised with monopolistic intent in every case has been
seriously questioned. See Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problen, 67
YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Baldwin & McFarland, snpra note 18. Director & Levi, Law and
the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. Rv. 281, 291-92 (1956).
24. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
25. Id. at 295. The contracts involved roughly $57,000,000 of gasoline, Standard's
own stations accounted for 6.8% of total sales, and those under requirements contracts
added another 6.7%; even taken together, the percentages did not give Standard a domi-
nant position in the market. In addition, there was said to be a trend in the industry
towards vertical integration at the dealer level. Whether the case turned on a single
figure or a conglomeration is debatable. For Justice Frankfurter's own view of his opinion
in Standard Stations, see FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392,
401 (1953). The case is extensively analyzed in Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract
and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1 (1959). For the varying and vehement responses
from the academy to Standard Stations, see the sources collected in Bok, The Tampa
Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements under the Clayton Act, 1961
SuPREmE CT. Rnv. 267, 275 n.28.
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the majority, stated that requirements contracts, unlike tying arrangements,
may offer economic advantages to buyers and sellers,20 and he suggested that
varying standards might be established to determine the effect on competition
of the two practices.27 Justice Frankfurter, however, rejected the possibility
of establishing a test measuring the economic usefulness of exclusive dealing
practices on the ground that the economic inquiry necessitated by such a test
would be "il-suited for ascertainment by courts. -s Instead, the Court ap-
parently adopted a test for requirements contracts which did not consider the
economic benefits of the arrangements but rather drew the line of illegality
at quantitative substantiality; a violation of the anti-trust laws presumably was
proved by the fact that competition had been foreclosed in a "substantial"
share of the line of commerce affected.2 9
Subsequently, the Court reassessed the test of Standard Stations in Tampa
Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,20 which involved a private antitrust attack
against a twenty-year requirements contract for the supply of coal, foreclosing
.77% of the relevant market.31 Rather than deciding that the slight degree of
foreclosure in Tampa Electric removed the case from the Standard Stations
test, the Supreme Court instead took this opportunity to reexamine the anti-
trust implications of requirements contracts 3 2 and, presumably, exclusive deal-
erships.3 3 The Court implied that the economic purposes of requirements con-
tracts should be given consideration, and held that the anticompetitive effect
of the practice must be assessed in the relevant geographic and product mar-
kets.35 Further, the Court stated that a mere showing of dollar amount sub-
stantially by itself will fail to establish illegality.30 Although the Tampa Electric
test may not replace completely that of Standard Stations,3 7 it certainly encour-
26. 337 U.S. at 306-07.
27. Id. at 307-08.
28. Id. at 310.
29. Id. at 298, 314.
30. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
31. Id. at 333.
32. Id. at 327.
33. The theory that exclusive dealerships and requirements contracts should be tested
under the same standards was accepted in Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F2d 505, 516
(2d Cir. 1964). It would not seem that exclusive dealerships deserve a per se test; in
fact, such practices received a form of blessing in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 270-71 n.11 (1963).
34. 365 U.S. 320, 334 (1961).
35. Id. at 327-29.
36. Id. at 334.
37. The court in Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 516 (2d Cir. 1964), thought
that Tampa Electric deviates from "the more rigorous and inflexible rule" of Standard
Stations, and implied that the Standard Stations test is a thing of the past. However,
there is language in Tampa Electric which suggests that the Standard Stations test is
still applicable in certain situations. See 365 U.S. 320, 334 (1961). This view of the
Tampa Electric case is supported in dicta in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294,330-31 (1962).
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ages the kind of economic inquiry which Standard Stations rejected, and which
Northern Pacific disallows in cases involving tying arrangements. While the
precise details of the Tampa Electric test remain unclear, at the least it estab-
lishes a more lenient standard than that applicable to tying arrangements.A9
When a court is presented with an exclusive dealing practice, the focus of
inquiry and perhaps the outcome will depend upon which of the two current
tests for exclusive dealing is applied. It is, then, of cardinal importance for
courts to distinguish between the practices in selecting the proper test. This
assumes, as does the current law, that various exclusive dealing practices are
readily distinguishable. Indeed, the opinions in Susser v. Carvel Corp.,80 a re-
cent Second Circuit case involving exclusive dealing arrangements, rested upon
this assumption. Analysis of the case, however, calls this crucial assumption
into question, and reveals that various exclusive dealing arrangements may,
in many situations, be indistinguishable.
In Carvel, nine Carrel franchisees attacked the Carrel franchise contract in
a treble damage antitrust action, and alleged that the franchise embodied three
illegal exclusive dealing practices: tying arrangements, 0 exclusive dealerships,41
and requirements contracts.4 Plaintiffs argued that they were forced to pur-
chase from Carvel or Carrel-approved sources the elements of the Carvel end
product - mix, cones, toppings, and flavorings - in order to acquire certain
equipment from Carrel. Plaintiffs characterized this provision of the contract
as a tying arrangement. 43 The obligation in the Carrel franchise which requires
38. This interpretation of Tampa Electric receives clear support in Susser v. Carvel
Corp., 332 F2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964). For an excellent and exhaustive analysis of the Tampa
Electric case, see Bok, supra note 25. Professor Bok considers Tampa Electric to have
moved away from the "uncompromising prohibition of Standard Stations," Id. at 283, not-
withstanding the fact that the factors relevant to the Tampa Electric test are vague.
Although Tampa Electric encourages a rational inquiry into relevant factors, a subsequent
case, Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir, 1962), seems to have
read Tampa Electric to apply only in de minimis foreclosure situations. Id. at 39. Prior
to the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Loew's, Inc.. 371 U.S. 38 (1962), some
commentators expressed forlorn hope that the Court's approach in Tampa Electric would
be extended to the law of tying arrangements. See Baldwin & McFarland, Supra note 18.
39. 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 33 U.S.L. WEK 3151 (U.S. Oct. 27,
1964). On different facts, Carvel's arrangements were attacked under § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. Carvel Corp., 3 TRADE Rz. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) f 16,921
(June 4, 1964). The examiner, on the reasoning of judge Lumbard's dissent in Susser v.
Carvel Corp., found only Carvel's alleged tying arrangement illegal under § 5.
40. Dealer's Franchise Agreement, Appendix Brief for Appellee, pp. 8.5e, 89c-90c,
Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
41. Id. at 89c.
42. The requirements contracts ran between Carvel and the independent suppllers
of end product elements. For examples, see Appendix Brief for Appellee, pp. 139e, 154c,
Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
43. At trial before the district court, Susser v. Carrel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 644
n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), Judge Dawson, finding for defendants on all the allegations, recog-
nized that the right to use the trademark was the focus of the arrangement. Since plai-
tiffs did not argue that characterization of the tying device, he based his opinion on the
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the dealers to sell only Carvel or Carvel-approved products was challenged
as an invalid exclusive dealership. And the requirements contracts between
Carvel and the suppliers of the elements of the end product were attacked as
refusals to deal which prevented the franchisees from purchasing elements
directly from the suppliers. Plaintiffs stipulated in a pre-trial order that they
were relying solely on per se violations of the antitrust laws, and would in-
troduce as evidence only the franchise and supplier contracts.
Both the majority of the court and Judge Lumbard in dissent agreed that
there was a tying arrangement, but found that the right to use Carve's trade-
mark, not various items of equipment, was the tying device and that the end
product elements, which had to be purchased from Carvel or from Carvel-
approved sources, were the tied products. The majority, however, found that
Carvers trademark did not generate sufficient economic power to bring the
tying arrangement within the scope of the northern Pacific test.46 This finding
was grounded on the majority's belief that the current test requires a factual
inquiry into the market power created by the tying device, and that the requi-
site power cannot be presumed from the fact that the tying device involved
a statutorily conferred monopoly.47 This reading of Northern Pacific, how-
ever, incorrectly emphasizes the importance of the role of the tying device;
such a factual investigation, in effect, removes much of the per se thrust of
the test. In addition, the majority's formulation of the test discounts the Su-
preme Court's holding in Loew's that sufficient power is to be presumed from
tying devices involving copyrights, patents and, inferentially, trademarks.
Disagreeing with the majority, Judge Lumbard accepted the presumption of
power doctrine of Loew's and reasoned that trademarks satisfy the presump-
tion.48 Since Judge Lumbard also found that the tied products involved a not
insubstantial amount of commerce, he considered the tying arrangement illegal 40
On a definitional level, however, Carve's alleged tying arrangement can be
analyzed as a requirements contract, rather than a tie-in. A probable object
of the arrangement was to provide a guaranteed source of end product elements
to the franchisees at stabilized prices - the goal usually attributed to require-
ments contracts. 0 If the franchisees pooled their purchasing power and entered
dispensing freezers as the tying articles, and found the tie-in legal on the ground that it
was necessary to protect Carvel's trademark. On appeal, plaintiffs seem to have continued
the argument that the tying device consisted of machinery.
44. The case also involved a price fixing allegation which is not herein discussed.
45. The circuit court was in disagreement as to the effect of the stipulation. Judge
Lumbard saw the pre-trial order as only limiting the evidence, 332 F2d at 512-13, while
the majority of the court was concerned with the substantive aspect of the stipulation,
332 F.2d at 518.
46. 332 F.2d at 519.
47. Id. at 519-21.
48. Id. at 513.
49. Id. at 514-15.
50. Judge Lumbard would apparently admit this to be at least one goal of the ar-
rangement. Id. at 514.
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into such contracts with suppliers, the arrangement dearly would be a require-
ments contract. And even if the franchisees requested Carvel to negotiate for
them with suppliers, the arrangement still could be defined as a requirements
contract. However, since Carvel took the initiative in contracting and stipu-
lated that the franchisees must accept their requirements from Carvel-selected
sources, that which definitionally might have been a requirements contract
becomes subject to characterization as a tying arrangement. But the possi-
bility of labeling Carvel's alleged tie-in a requirements contract cannot be
discarded lightly, since in two cases involving similar circumstances, the re-
quirements contract characterization has prevailed.r1
Even if Carvel's arrangement fits the definitional characteristics of a tying
arrangement, Judge Lumbard, in finding Carvel's arrangement illegal, appar-
ently overlooked the possibility that the economic injuries against which the
Northern Pacific test is directed may not result from the variety of tying ar-
rangement employed by Carvel. If this is true, doubts may be raised con-
cerning the rationality of measuring Carvel's alleged tying arrangement tinder
the Northern Pacific test. The usual tie-in attacked under the antitrust laws
is thought to involve the sale or lease of two different products or services by
one seller who seeks an additional profit from the transaction that he could
not obtain absent the tie-in 2 Carvel's tie-in seems different, however, since
Carvel did not manufacture the tied products, and did not attempt to establish
itself in the market for the tied products 3 Moreover, if Carvel's tie-in had
51. In Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962), a
franchisee was required to purchase the ingredients of mattresses made under a trademark
from sources designated by the franchisor. The court refused to accept the characterization
of the practice as a tying arrangement, instead labelling it a requirements contract, Id.
at 410. In Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954), the practice attacked
involved the right to use the "Anchor" tradename on the condition that the distributors
of the hog cholera serum purchase their requirements from Anchor. Id. at 869. This ar-
rangement was considered a requirements contract, though under the reasoning of the
Carvel court it would be a tying arrangement.
52. The concept of a tying arrangement as a monopolizing device, used by a seller
to maneuver himself into a second market, is discussed supra at note 23.
53. The court in Carvel and Judge Lumbard in dissent noted that Carvel seemed to
make some profit on the sale of cones to the dealers. The court did not think the amount
significant enough for concern. Judge Lumbard, on the other hand, was quite concerned
with the fact that Carvel paid $9.50 per thousand for cones it sold the dealers at $10,00.
This fact is, however, inadequate to illustrate that Carvel employed the tying arrangement
directly as a profit tool. The fifty cent variance represented the overhead involved in
Carvel's storage of the cones; it buys the cones in large amounts, in order to keep a
supply on hand to service the dealers' needs. The price variance thus represents an ex-
pense by Carvel which presumably would otherwise be charged to the dealers by the
suppliers, through a higher cone price to Carvel, had the suppliers carried the risk of
storage. Rather than use the tying arrangement as a source of profit, Carvel derives
its gain from a royalty on the amount of ice cream mix used by the dealers, and from
the sale to the dealers of various non-tied supplies and machinery. See Dealer's Franchise
Agreement, Appendix Brief for Appellee, pp. 85, 90c, Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d
505 (2d Cir. 1964).
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in fact diminished the competition in the market for the end-product elements,
a result which is said to be the reason for employing tying arrangements, the
ultimate beneficiary of the increased power would not have been Carvel but
independent suppliers. It appears unreasonable to assume that Carvel would
have sought to increase the market power of its suppliers, since the added
power might have given these suppliers the ability to raise the prices on the
products sold to Carvel. When seen in this light, Carvel's tie-in does not
seem susceptible to characterization as a power-transferring device designed
to secure for Carvel a position in the market for the tied products.
With respect to the potential foreclosure of competing suppliers, Judge Lum-
bard admitted that Carvel's tie-in did not fit the usual pattern, where the seller
forecloses all competition in the market for the tied product; as he stated,
,. . it must be conceded that vigorous competition would probably exist
among... suppliers to secure the initial contract with the Carvel organization."54
He nevertheless found the tie-in illegal, arguing that the resulting competition
would be substantially different from that which would exist without the
tie-in. "... . [C]ompetition [for the supplier contracts] will most likely take
the form of substantial price concessions and the concomitant inability of smaller
suppliers effectively to compete with larger producers who are capable of
meeting Carvel's price and service demands."sr Although this concept of a
"competitive advantage" has been utilized by several lower courts in con-
demning mergers under section 7 of the Clayton Act,"" Judge Lumbard's use
of it as grounds for decision in a section 3 Clayton Act suit is inappropriate.07
Where the theory has been applied to mergers, the courts have never employed
it without a somewhat extensive inquiry into the nature and effect of the com-
54. 332 F.2d 505, 514 (2d Cir. 1964).
55. Ibid. It is not clear whether Judge Lumbard assumed that the larger competitor
will always be successful where competing with smaller competitors for contracts. Such
an assumption would be unvarranted, for it is quite possible that a smaller competitor
could be more efficient or be willing to offer a lower price in hopes of moving into a new
market. It must be admitted that Carvel's alleged tying arrangement does not prevent
any supplier from ultimately serving the dealers. The arrangement simply channels the
suppliers to the dealers through the medium of contracting with Carvel for the system's
requirements.
56. See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Procter
& Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) It 16,673 (DkL 6901). United States
v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 5 TRADE Ra. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) ff 71,181 (S.D.N.Y.
1964). Of interest is the fact that the Kennecott opinion was written by Judge Dawson,
who in deciding the Carvel case in the district court did not find any competitive advantage
injuries flowing from Carvel's alleged tie-in.
57. In addition to the stated objections to Judge Lumbard's use of such a theory,
it is well to note that the theory has been operative only where permanent structural
changes in an industry have been created by a merger. A contract setting such as Carvel's
one year requirements contracts with suppliers hardly offers a threat of permanent struc-
tural change in an industry. The Supreme Court has expressed its greater concern with
permanent effects, as opposed to temporary alterations. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 at 332 n.55 (1962) (dicta).
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petitive advantage created by the merger."' Rather than pursue such an inquiry,
Judge Lumbard utilized a per se approach and merely assumed that a com-
petitive advantage was created by the Carvel arrangement and that the advan-
tage caused injury in the suppliers' market. It is also possible that the use
of this theory in a contract setting, to supply an economic injury where total
foreclosure is absent, fails to demonstrate an economic injury significant
enough to warrant a per se test of illegality. For whenever parties enter con-
tracts, the buyer's goal is to achieve the best competitive price and the con-
tract will usually be awarded to the most efficient competitor. If Judge Lum-
bard's theory means that the efficient competitor achieves a competitive ad-
vantage and the unsuccessful competitor suffers a compensable injury, then
many commonplace commercial contracts would seem to raise an antitrust
concern."0
Judge Lumbard's dissent also emphasized the dealers' surrender of their
right to select suppliers as proof that Carvel's tying arrangement produced a
loss of choice by buyers - an injury which the Northcrn Pacific test sought
to prevent. Proof of this injury would seem to require showing that the fran-
chisees were independent businessmen; the fact that they did not receive
salaries and did have capital invested in the franchises seems to establish inde-
pendence. On the other hand, the dealers were not wholly independent, since
they were required to follow the elaborate regulations of an operating manual,
which governed their behavior in great detail. The franchisees had no choice in
the products they could sell; the appearance of their stores was determined
by Carvel, as were the uniforms they wore; advertising displays were selected
by Carvel; and even the amount of insurance that had to be carried by the
franchisees was determined by Carvel.60 Considering these restrictions on the
franchisees' independence, their inability to choose sources of supplies does
not seem as relevant as in the case of completely independent buyers. In sum,
since the alleged tying arrangement did not produce the expected injuries,
weight should be given to the possibility that Carvel's arrangement was, in
effect, nothing more than a requirements contract.
In addition to the alleged tie-in, the Carvel case also involved the legality
of the requirements contract which provided that Carvel would purchase the
franchisees' requirements of end product elements from certain suppliers. Al-
though the requirements contract was attacked as an arrangement which pre-
cluded the dealers from dealing directly with the suppliers - creating an
58. The kind of test which has been applied to the merger cases thought to involve
"competitive advantage (see note 56 supra) is more comparable to the test of Tampa
Electric than to that of Northern Pacific.
59. This objection to Judge Lumbard's use of the "competitive advantage" theory
envisions a large scale contract such as Carvel's. It is not meant to suggest that Judge
Lumbard seeks to apply the theory to contracts of unnoticeable proportions.
60. For a more detailed enumeration of the limitations on the dealers' commercial
behavior, see Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 at 508-09 (2d Cir. 1964), and the
Dealer's Franchise Agreement in the Appendix Brief for Appellee, p. 85c, Ibid.
[Vol. M4:691
EXCLUSIVE DEALING PRACTICES
injury to the dealers rather than to competing suppliers - the presence of a
requirements contract in the Carvel system offers an opportunity to compare
such contracts to tie-ins.
Requirements contracts have been recognized by the Supreme Court to
have potential valid economic purposes and, perhaps for this reason alone, to
be deserving of an antitrust test different from tying arrangements.(" Among
the possible reasons for entering a requirements contract is that such contracts
enable the buyer to acquire a guaranteed source of supply for his needs, fre-
quently on favorable price and service terms. Since a requirements contract
may involve a one-shot negotiation, it would seem as well that the adminis-
trative expenses of entering frequent contracts are avoided. The Supreme
Court's relatively lenient attitude towards requirements contracts also seems
to imply that such arrangements do not involve an exercise of leverage by
the seller or coercion of the buyer - evils often associated with tying ar-
rangements.62 This assumption may be unviarranted, however, since it is quite
possible that a requirements contract seller may enjoy dominance in the
market for the desired product. In such cases the seller might have adequate
market power to force a buyer to purchase only his total requirements from
the seller, with the harsh alternative of purchasing none at all.0s Thus, in
some circumstances, one party to the contract may be able to exert leverage
over the other party. Any requirements contract, moreover, will always result
in complete foreclosure of competing sellers for the duration of the contract.
Finally, in the situation where a buyer would prefer to contract for less than
full requirements, a seller who demands a full requirements provision forces
the buyer to forego his choice of other suppliers for the volume of products
not actually desired. It would appear, on this analysis, that a requirements
contract between parties of unequal economic power can yield the precise
economic injuries which are said to flow from tying arrangements.
Even so, some may argue that requirements contracts are still to be con-
sidered a less evil form of economic practice than tying arrangements because
they do not involve a transfer of power from one product to another. This
argument, no doubt, would rest on the belief that for a transfer of power
to occur, the practice must involve two different products. An example vill
suffice to illustrate the conceptual difficulty of determining when products
do in fact differ. Assume that a retail liquor dealer wishes to stock J.&B.
Scotch whiskey for his many customers who desire that brand. Assume further
that the J.&B. distributor requires the dealer to purchase J.&B. for his entire
requirements of Scotch whiskey in order to get any J.&B. Then posit the
dealer attacking the distributor's practice as a tying arrangement in an anti-
61. See text at notes 23-38 supra.
62. Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-07 (1949).
63. In an inverse situation it is also possible that a buyer with large needs would
approach a comparatively smaller seller and demand that the seller provide the buyer's
total requirements or suffer the alternative of providing none of the buyer's needs.
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trust action.6 The distributor responds in defense that he simply was oper-
ating on a requirements contract basis, and demands the case be heard under
the test of Tampa Electric, which would enable him to show that the fore-
closure he created was at best minimal in the market for whiskey and that
valid business purposes justified the practice. The distributor relies upon the
theory that even if he has caused the feared injuries of the Northern Pacific
case he is selling one product only, rather than tying different products to-
gether. The plaintiff, however, argues that the Northern Pacific test governs
on the theory that although J.&B. whiskey appears to constitute a single
product, the quantity desired and that which he was forced to purchase are
in fact different products: all the liquor beyond that desired is a different
product to the buyer because he did not want it. At this point, the judge hearing
the case should recognize the similarity between plaintiff's argument on the
nature of different products and the theory of tie-in law that the buyer is forced
to take a product he does not want in order to acquire a product he wishes
to purchase. Whether this example involves a tie-in or a requirements contract
thus becomes a problem in the metaphysics of "different" products. As the
hypothetical suggests, many requirements contracts can be analyzed as tie-ins
both on a definitional level and in terms of the economic injuries resulting
from their use. Yet the choice of characterization will be of immense impor-
tance to the litigants, since it will likely determine which of two fundamentally
different legal tests will be applied to the case.
The third form of exclusive dealing which appeared in the Carvel case was
an arrangement which created exclusive dealerships: the dealers were allowed
to sell only Carrel or Carrel-approved products. The court in Carrel unani-
mously disposed of the allegation that the exclusive dealerships constituted an
antitrust violation.6 5 Since the plaintiffs had stipulated that they were alleging
only per se violations of the antitrust laws, and therefore did not introduce
any market data concerning the effect of the exclusive dealerships, 0 the court
held that plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the Tampa Electric test. As additional
support for its decision, the court went on to find that Carvel's exclusive dealer-
ships withstood "any attack" on their legality because of the valid economic
purpose which brought them into being - protection of the Carrel trademark. 1
64. If hypotheticals must bear some correlation to the real world, assume the prac-
tice is of such proportions as to attract attention.
65. The court in Carvel found that exclusive dealerships involved "one form" of
exclusive dealing, and by inference held that all forms of exclusive dealing except tying
arrangements should be tested under the standards of Tampa Electric rather than those
of Northern Pacific. 332 F.2d at 516.
66. See note 45 supra.
67. While the Tampa Electric test allows an inquiry into the purpose of an exclusive
dealing arrangement, nothing in the Tampa Electric case suggests that valid purposo
standing alone will conclusively establish legality. An exclusive dealing practice, regardless




The value of the Carvel trademark, the court reasoned, would be diluted if
the dealers were allowed to sell non-Carvel products over which Carvel might
not be able to exercise effective quality control.cs
Potential valid economic purpose, however, should not blind a court to the
economic injuries which an exclusive dealership may produce, nor to the
striking similarity of such injuries to those produced by tying arrangements.
A dealer bound by an exclusive dealership agreement has no choice as to the
products he can sell. Consequently, the suppliers of all other products which
the dealer wishes to sell are completely foreclosed from the dealer's market.
And in those cases where the dealer wishes to continue selling the "exclusive"
product, the grantor of the exclusive dealership has the ultimate power to re-
voke the dealership if the dealer does not abide by its restrictions. In such cases,
the threat of revocation certainly gives the grantor leverage over the dealer,
and insures the dealer's loss of choice and the ensuing foreclosure.
While an exclusive dealership may be thought to involve only the protected
product, such arrangements are subject to a definitional analysis which may
illustrate the possible comparability of exclusive dealerships and tying arrange-
ments. As long as the dealers are not allowed to sell competing products, each
sale of the protected product may be at the expense of the competing product
which would have been sold but for the restriction on the range of products
offered. In such a situation the exclusive dealership can be used as a vehicle
for extending the protected product's penetration of the competitive market.
Arguably, in a situation where the dealer would prefer to sell both the pro-
tected and the competitive products, the forced continuation of sale of the
protected product constitutes what may definitionally be a tie-in of the sale
of one product to the sale of another. The exclusive dealership requires the
dealer to buy and sell more of the protected product than he desires, and to
refrain from buying and selling competitive products. As with requirements
contracts, it can be argued that the dealer is buying different products - those
he wants and those he doesn't want.0 Although this analysis may appear
strained, it suggests that exclusive dealerships, as well as requirements con-
tracts, may not only embody the feared injuries of tying arrangements, but
may actually involve the definitional equivalent of a tie-in, rendered successful
by virtue of the dominant party's leverage.7"
The foregoing analysis indicates that it may be difficult for courts to dis-
tinguish various forms of exclusive dealing by looking to definitional character-
istics and to the economic injuries resulting from a particular practice. For
this reason, and because the parties' characterization of the challenged prac-
tices will be unreliable, courts will be forced to rely on other grounds of dis-
68. 332 F.2d at 516-17.
69. See text at notes 63-65 mtpra.
70. Exclusive dealerships, like requirements contracts, also may have valid business
purposes. See Bo, supra note 25, at 307-10. The Umloau Comi.crAL CODE § 2-306(2)
codifies one of the economic purposes of exclusive dealerships.
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tinction between the practices if the conflicting tests are to be maintained and
applied in a rational manner.
A court might try to distinguish exclusive dealing practices by applying
the more lenient test of Tampa Electric to those which involve economies cre-
ated by vertical integration, leaving other practices to be tested by the Northern
Pacific rule. This, however, would not seem a trustworthy distinction for pre-
serving the dichotomy between the current tests; since exclusive dealing ar-
rangements involve parties at two levels - buyers and sellers - arguably all
such arrangements are vertical integrating devices. In the Carvel case, for
example, all three forms of exclusive dealing may have functioned as vertical
integrating devices. The suppliers, through the requirements contract, con-
stituted what was in effect a manufacturing division; the exclusive dealerships
provided a sales division; and the alleged tie-in connected the manufacturing
and sales functions.
Another line of distinction open to courts would involve an inquiry into
the reasons for employing any challenged exclusive dealing arrangement. For
such an inquiry to yield a rational answer, it would have to rest on facts rather
than presumptions. Although the Supreme Court has long adhered to a pre-
sumption that tying arrangements' have hardly any purpose beyond the sup-
pression of competition, and no redeeming virtues,71 the Court also has sug-
gested that tie-ins may be justifiable in two instances - where a small company
is trying to gain entry into a new market 72 and where specifications for the tied
products cannot practicably be given.78 Given these exceptions, there seems
to be no basis for the Court to foreclose the inquiry into purpose when other
justifications are offered. The possibility that some tying arrangements may
have valid business purposes has been suggested by Professor Bowman. 74 In
addition to the examples he offers, there is also a variety of tying arrangement
which involves the sale of a machine, with materials used by the machine tied
to the sale, but in circumstances where the seller binds himself to provide
the buyer's needs for the materials at market prices. This kind of tie-in may
simply be a requirements contract between a seller who makes a market in
71. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
72. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962); White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiant, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
73. The Supreme Court stated in Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293 (1949): "The only situation, indeed, in which the protection of good will may
necessitate the use of tying clauses is where specifications for a substitute would be so
detailed that they could not practicably be supplied" 337 U.S. at 306. See Dehydrating
Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961).
See generally Comment, Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Law: "The Integrity
of Product" Defense, 62 Micu. L. REv. 1413 (1964).
74. See Bowman, supra note 23. For an explanation of the tying arrangement involved
in United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) see Stigler, United States v. Loetts
Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 SumaR= CT. Rav. 152.
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the tied products and a buyer who needs the tied products - an arrangement
presumably resulting in the efficiencies associated with requirements contracts5
A presumption that such a tying arrangement has no valid business purpose
would be wholly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's analysis of require-
ments contracts. And, as illustrated by the Carrel case, a tying arrangement
may be employed by a trademark franchisor in order to achieve efficient quality
control over his franchisees. If, for example, the franchisees used a large
number of suppliers, the cost of policing the quality of the product would
be greater than where Carvel can pursue quality control over a smaller num-
ber of suppliers.7 6
If, however, a court were to pursue an inquiry into the purpose of an ex-
clusive dealing arrangement in order to discover which of the current tests
should apply, the Northern Pacific test would be sterilized, since the court
would have to allow the defendant to enter detailed evidence which could not
be ignored through reliance on a sweeping presumption. Notwithstanding this
result of an inquiry into purpose, it is doubtful that such an investigation would
offer grounds for distinguishing various practices. For unless a court could
find that the purposes were "good" or "bad," it would have no basis upon
which selection could be made between the conflicting tests. The result of the
inquiry would, more often than not, indicate merely that the purpose lay
somewhere between the absolutes, and could not by itself be determinative.
In sum, neither the definitional characteristics of a practice, nor the potential
economic injuries, nor the purpose for its use, standing alone or in conjunction,
75. This may have been the variety of tie-in before the Supreme Court in Inter-
national Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). The tie-in there provided that
the seller would fulfill the buyer's needs for the tied products at market prices; if the
seller could not so provide, the buyer was free to shop the market. Id. at 394-95 & n.5.
76. Beyond the desire to attain efficient quality control. a franchisor is required to
maintain some degree of control to protect his trademark Congress established the
necessity for some quality controls to protect trademarks in the Lanham Act:
Where a registered mark... is . . . used legitimately by related companies, such
use shall inure to the benefit of the registrant... and such use shall not affect the
validity of such mark.. .provided such mark is not used in such manner as to
deceive the public.
60 Stat 429 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1958). A related company is: "[A]ny person
who legitimately controls or is controlled.., in respect to the nature and quality of the
goods or services in connection with which the mark is used." 60 Stat. 443 (1946), 15
U.S.C § 1127 (1958). The consequences to a franchisor who fails to exercise adequate
control over his franchisees are severe:
A mark shall be deemed to be "abandoned"... when any course of conduct of
the registrant.. . causes the mark to lose its significance as an indication of origin.
60 Stat. 444 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1958). See also 60 Stat. 433 (1946), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1064(e) (1962).
For an analysis of the quality control aspect of the Carrel case, see Note, 63 IfwEr. L.
REV. 550 (1965). For an extensive view of trademark franchising and its antitrust impli-
cations see Comment, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing,
72 YALE LJ. 1171, 1197-98 (1963).
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can offer a reliable basis for distinction which would allow application of the
two current tests. With exclusive dealing practices in this posture, maintain-
ing both tests is irrational. It is, of course, possible that the courts might opt
to apply the strict test of Northern Pacific to all forms of exclusive dealing.
Such an approach, however, seems unwise, since it would result in holding
illegal many practices which may have valid economic purposes, may create
efficiencies, and may not be anticompetitive. The only reliable alternative open
to the courts would require an examination of the purpose and effect of an
exclusive dealing arrangement. Whatever the precise formulation of this al-
ternative may be, the result should include the kind of judicial inquiry endorsed
by Tampa Electric.7 If this approach to the exclusive dealing problem will
preserve those arrangements which offer redeeming economic virtues and
which do not cause significant anticompetitive effect, the burden of inquiry
imposed on the courts is justified.
77. If courts were to opt for the alternative which would remove the per se concept
from the area of exclusive dealing, they could take comfort in the fact that other areas
of antitrust law may also be moving away from per se standards. See White Motor Co,
v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), and United States v. Penn-Olin Chem, Co., 378
U.S. 158 (1964), for recent Supreme Court refusals to expand the reach of per se rules,
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